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“To what extent have the domestic objectives of the Al-Fatah Revolution and 
the Third Universal Theory been implemented in Libya since 1969?” 
 
 
1. Libya: an ideological nomad 
 
Libya is an often ignored but highly important case for political scientists and theorists 
to analyse when studying concepts such as decolonisation, democratisation and 
socialism in practice.  Harbouring a distinct political ideology - a theoretical hybrid of 
Arab nationalism, socialism and communism - Libya can be seen to provide a 
seemingly unique form of government, both in theory and practice. 
 
Ernest Gellner best encapsulated this unique national combination in the following 
review of John Davis’ first work on the country:  
 
‘Libya is important…because it combines five…features which are also 
present elsewhere, though not in this combination: it is radically revolutionary; 
it is endowed with an enormous oil wealth; it is reacting to decolonization; it 
exemplifies a puritan and fundamentalist form of Islam; and although it is a 
dictatorship, it toys with aspirations towards statelessness and a kind of direct 
popular self-government’.1 
 
Rather than compare Libya with other states based on path-dependent normative 
criteria, this essay will identify the objectives of the Free Officer Movement in 
overthrowing the Libyan monarchy in 1969 and theories that followed, evaluating the 
extent to which these ‘aspirations’ were achieved.  In this sense, the essay will 
evaluate the extent to which there was any measurable practical application of the 
ideology behind the Al-Fatah Revolution and Third Universal Theory, ascertaining 
whether it is any more than an ideological mirage to hide a conventional dictatorship, 
as is often the popular perception. 
 
The wider importance of such an evaluation is to ascertain if Libya is a distinct 
theoretical and practical model of government, or simply the conjecture and rhetoric 
that emerges as a product of realpolitik.  As such this essay will seek to judge 
                                                 
1 Gellner, E, 1987 in Davis, J, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution (London, I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1987) 
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revolutionary objectives in their own terms rather than judging them by external 
conceptual standards.  In order to avoid path-dependency, I will first carry out a 
diachronic historical synopsis of the causes of the Al-Fatah Revolution in order to 
provide a context for Revolutionary objectives. 
 
The evaluation itself will first require a coherent identification of what the objectives of 
the Al-Fatah Revolution and Third Universal Theory were, for which I will use both 
secondary literature review but also the primary document of Colonel Qaddafi’s 
political theory, The Green Book.  Although my interpretation of his Theory will be 
affected by my own normative assumptions, I believe that as I will be comparing the 
objectives of the Theory directly with political practice, that his method is most valid.   
I will supplement my findings with the view of Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, the son of the 
‘Leader of the Revolution’.2   The opportunity to interview the Leader’s son is in itself 
a sign of changing times, and I will critically analyse his public views as a gauge of 
Libya’s objectives in the modern world. 
 
In measuring the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, I will combine a 
qualitative and quantitative approach, through an exhaustive literature review and 
statistical data where applicable.  It should be noted that there is a considerable lack 
of publicly available data regarding electoral outcomes, thus I will rely more heavily 
on quantitative data in analysing the economic objectives. 
 
This approach should provide enough empirical evidence with which one can 
conclude the extent to which the domestic objectives of the Revolution have been 
achieved, and, where relevant, the current direction in which Libya is heading vis á 
vis those original theories and aims in the modern world.  
 
                                                 
2 Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafii no longer fulfils any constitutional role in Libyan government, but is now 
commonly addressed as ‘Leader of the Revolution’. 
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2. Oil and Nationalism: The Al-Fatah Revolution in context 
 
Before identifying the objectives of the Al-Fatah Revolution, it is certainly necessary 
to provide a short synopsis of the causation of the revolution itself - for as 
Vandewalle identifies, ‘the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy came not 
unexpectedly’;3 it is imperative to place such goals in the historical and political 
context from which they were borne. 
 
Upon gaining its independence in 1951, Libya’s constitutional monarchy consisted of 
three disparate federal regions – Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan.  At this 
point, despite being the fourth largest country in Africa, Libya had little by way of 
(known) resources and was certainly a rather economically docile and stagnant 
country.  This would all change upon the discovery of oil. 
 
Academic literature appears somewhat divided between those who believe that the 
coup lead by Qaddafi was a response to the failing of the monarch, and those that 
believe that the system of monarchy was inherently incapable to responding to the 
socio-economic and ideological changes that were sweeping through Libya.  The 
balance weighs more heavily in favour of monarchy being an insufficient mode of 
government, but given that there still exists many monarchical oil-exporting countries 
in the world, one certainly cannot negate domestic contingent factors entirely. 
 
In some respects Libya’s immediate post-independence political history echoes that 
of Morocco and Jordan, with King Idris confronting the main nationalist party, the 
Tripolitanian National Congress, in 1952, before seizing all political power, keeping 
parliament firmly under his direct influence.4  However, unlike Jordan and Morocco, 
there were considerable differences with the political operation of Libya that lent itself 
to provide a breeding ground for revolution. 
 
Owen in particular posts the blame more at the governing traits of Idris I, rather than 
wider socio-economic factors.  He levies three main criticisms at the King to imply it 
                                                 
3 Vandewalle, D. A History of Modern Libya  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) Page 77 
4 Owen, R, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd Edition (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2004) Page 53 
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was the monarch himself rather the form of government that was overthrown, in the 
first instance at least.  Firstly, the limited size of the royal family proved a 
predicament for the King.  As a result of a confrontation with rebellious relatives in 
1954, one of who had murdered his senior aide, the King confined the succession of 
the throne to his brother and blood members of his own line, depriving the remainder 
of his family of their royal titles and right to hold public office.  To compound this 
shortage of royal talent, King Idris had no son of his own to succeed him.5   Secondly, 
‘the king showed none of the energy of a Hussein or a Hassan in constantly 
reinforcing his legitimacy and in reminding his subjects of his authority by endless 
public performance, preferring instead to hide himself away…and to manipulate the 
political system from afar.’6 A final crucial difference - and one which eventually 
proved a more acute problem - was the King’s failure to maintain personal control 
over the regular army, or to impose a manageable standard of behaviour either on 
close relatives or his key advisors when it came to nepotism and corruption.7 
 
Overall, whilst grievances were certainly exacerbated by King Idris’ particular actions, 
there were arguably wider nationalist and socio-economic reasons behind the 
revolution.  The discovery of sizeable oil reserves in 1959 and the subsequent 
income from petroleum exports enabled what had been one of the world's poorest 
countries to become extremely wealthy in a very short period of time. Between 1960-
1970, total GDP per capita increased by 24.8 per cent.8  Although oil drastically 
improved Libya's finances, popular resentment grew as wealth was increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of economic and political elites. 
 
El-Kikhia cites that the unification of the federal system in 1962, as a result of 
lobbying from oil companies unwilling to navigate both state and regional regulation, 
meant that power was concentrated within a unitary clique, making a coup 
increasingly viable.9  Further, the increased dependence of Libya’s ruling elite on oil, 
alleviating their need to garner political compliance through taxation, meant that the 
                                                 
5 Owen, R, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Page 54 
6 Owen, R, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Page 54 
7 Owen, R, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East,  Page 54 
8 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 
1993) Page 96.   
9 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction, Page 37 
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Libyan people became increasingly subject to what Katouzian labels ‘petrolic 
despotism’.10  
 
To compound domestic economic factors, the monarch showed little skill in 
distancing himself from the British and the Americans, whom had long had unpopular 
military bases in the country and whose companies were now seen to be extorting 
Libya’s wealth with relatively small gains for the ordinary Libyan.  On the backdrop of 
the wave of decolonisation as the ‘winds of change [were] blowing through Africa’11, 
Libya’s monarchy seemed entirely out of kilter with the zeitgeist of the continent.   
 
Of course politically, Libya’s people were increasingly aligning themselves with the 
growing ideology of Arab Nationalism.  The neighbouring Egyptian regime of Nasser 
had led to mass mobilisation in Libya, through the media, an influx of Egyptian 
migrant workers and an increasing number of Libyans studying in Cairo.  Egyptian 
life permeated Libyan governmental systems and with it came increasingly Arab 
Nationalist sentiments; even the Libyan judiciary was run by graduates of the Al-
Azhar University of Cairo.12 
 
A groundswell in education led to an increasingly politicised younger generation 
finding themselves stifled by the monarchical system.  Popular participation was 
denied, as it simply did not benefit the political elites who surrounded the King.  As a 
result, there were riots in 1964 in which four students were shot by security forces, 
whilst the oil workers’ strike of 1967 demonstrated solidarity with the Arabs over their 
war with Israel, the final major point of contention.13 
 
The failure of the King to enter the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 in support of Libya’s Arab 
comrades, especially given the country’s oil wealth, meant that social unrest would 
reach a peak.  The Libyan monarch made no attempt to negotiate with the growing 
internal opposition, led by intellectuals, students and employees of the oil industry.  
This resulted in an increased desire amongst the Libyan people to achieve 
                                                 
10 Katouzian, H. The political economy of oil exporting countries, Peuples méditerranéens 1:3:22 
11 Macmillan, H., Address to the South African Parliament, 1960 
12 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction, Page 38; Al-Azhar University is considered 
to have the foremost authorities on Islamic religion and Sharia in the Muslim world. 
13 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction Page 38-39 
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representation and ‘freedom’ of political action and speech – or at least populist 
expression, as opposed to absolutist rule.  Meanwhile, El-Kikhia emphasises that the 
Libyan monarchy, ‘could not meet the demands of changing economic conditions’; 
the laissez-faire model was certainly not sharing its wealth with the ordinary Libyan.14 
 
Davis compounds economic and political crises with military and moral failures: 
‘certainly, young officers were alarmed by the…neglect of the army; some of them 
were shocked by political and administrative corruption and by more directly sensual 
evils apparent in the booming cities.’ However, he also concurs with El-Kikhia that, 
‘the main focus of their dismay was their government’s inability or refusal to support 
the interests of the Arab nation.’15 
 
For months preceding the coup there had been persistent rumours of plans for a 
military takeover.  On balance, the revolution was a culmination of socio-economic 
and ideological factors, enhanced with the personal failings of this particular 
monarch.  However, the relevance of these factors to this essay is that the failings of 
the monarchy provided the motives and raison d’etat for the post-revolutionary 
government; the causes of the military coup directly shaped the objectives of the Al-
Fatah Revolution in the short-term, and guided the more long-term aspirations of the 
Third Universal Theory as it came to emerge. 
 
  
                                                 
14 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction Page 39 
15 Davis, J, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution Page 30 
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3. The Al-Fatah Revolution: ‘Freedom, Socialism, and Unity’  
 
Upon seizing power from the monarchy in a bloodless coup on September 1st 1969, 
the ‘Free Officers’ had no clear ideological blueprint to follow; therefore the initial 
objectives of the Al-Fatah Revolution were largely responsive to popular 
sentiments.16 The initial objectives were to as far as possible alleviate the popular 
pressure that had built up regarding Libya’s role in supporting the Arab Nation, the 
presence of Britain and America on Libyan soil, and the foreign plutocracy that 
operated within Libya’s economy.  Having abolished the constitution and ruling by 
decree, it would be easy to argue that Qaddafi and the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) were ruling simply to satiate their own political bend. 
 
However, it can certainly be argued that before 1973, the RCC’s political agenda 
emerged distinctly from below, as Qaddafi became the champion of Islam and Arab 
unity at home and abroad.17  Whilst on the international scene Libyan petrodollars 
flooded towards all Muslim movements wherever they existed, at home the first year 
of the revolution witnessed the ‘Egyptification’ of Libya, culminating in the unification 
of the two countries in 1970.  However, what is clear is that for the first three years of 
his rule, ‘Qaddafi himself did not appear to have an idea of how the country should 
be run’.18  Libya’s slogan since the revolution has been, ‘freedom, socialism, and 
unity.  However in the years immediately after the coup, these goals were met with 
only partial success.19 
 
Indeed in this period, only three immediate objectives appeared in the public domain.  
First was the eradication of all things ‘colonial’ and ‘alien’.   This was not a difficult 
task for the RCC to achieve, given the fact the political freedom was too suppressed 
under the monarchy and the grip of Arab Nationalism had become all the more 
fervent.  Moreover, freedom here was more in the sense of collective freedom from 
Western imperialism, as opposed to a more Western concept of individual negative 
liberty. The first decree issued by the newly created RCC, was therefore to expel all 
British and American troops on the premise of achieving ‘true decolonisation’.  
                                                 
16 Muscat, F. My President, My Son (Valetta, Malta: Edam Publishing, 1980) Page 7 
17 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction Page 41 
18 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction Page 41 
19 EL-Kikhia, M.O. Libya’s Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction Page 41 
James Caspell 
8 
Simultaneously, 20,000 Italian residents were expelled from Libya and replaced in 
the bureaucracy by appointees from local Libyan tribes.20   Secondly, there was a 
clear attempt by Qaddafi to embody himself as the revolution and vice-versa, not 
simply for his own benefit but to garner the unity required in accepting Arab 
nationalism.  Here again, this did not prove difficult.  By endearing himself to Islam he 
appealed to a conservative base; by advocating Arab nationalism he appealed to the 
masses and by neither nationalising property as Nasser had done nor restricting their 
ability to acquire wealth, Qaddafi did not offend the growing Libyan bourgeoisie.  In 
fact, Qaddafi’s first five-year plan helped the private sector to increase its wealth at a 
phenomenal rate.21 
 
As for Libyan Socialism, the term was not used in it’s Marxist sense until the end of 
the 1970’s, after the publishing of the second part of The Green Book.  In this 
ephemeral period, the regime had no objection to the operation of the private sector, 
and Qaddafi permitted public and private sectors to operate simultaneously.22  The 
state actively encouraged what was called ‘non-exploitative’ capitalism, again 
interpreted in a national sense - the state encouraged entrepreneurs to employ native 
Libyans and the idea was that exploitation –and therefore poverty – could be 
prevented via taxation.23  
 
However, the abundance of public corporations that sub-contracted their 
development projects to either private companies, or as in most cases, international 
companies, meant that Libya could not in the early days be called a socialist state in 
the fashion that even Qaddafi claimed it to be, akin to Egypt.  Indeed Ruth First 
highlights that Libya’s state simply intervened and co-ordinated the market to begin 
with, rather than seek to replace it, despite collectivist rhetoric.24 
 
                                                 
20 El-Fathaly, O.I. and Palmer, M. Political Development and Social Change in Libya (Lexington: D.C.Heath:, 
Mass., 1977) Page 39 
21 Libyan Government, Maslahat al-Ihsa’ wa-al-Ta’dad. Report on the Third Phase of the Household Sample 
Survey (Benghazi Town): Household Expenditure (Libyan Arab Republic Technical Planning Body). (Tripoli: 
Libyan Arab Republic, 1976) 
22 Elmaihub, A. The Role of the Public Sector in the Development Strategy: The Case of Libya (Benghazi: Dept. 
of Economics, University of Garyounis, 1981) 
23 First, R., ‘Libya: Class and State in an Oil Economy’ in Oil and Class Struggle, edited by Peter Nore and 
Teresa Turner: (London: Zed, 1974) Pages 119-140 
24 First, R., ‘Libya: Class and State in an Oil Economy’ in Oil and Class Struggle, Pages 119-140 
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It is certainly accurate to point that this hybrid form of  ‘Libyan socialism’ effectively 
meant that planning was still motivated by profit, rather than by need, a concept that 
would later feature as crucial in Qaddafi’s Third Universal Theory.  However the 
extent to which the state was co-ordinating bourgeois investment should not be 
underplayed.  After their first four years in power, the Government had directed the 
building of houses, factories, roads, schools and other infrastructure, but there was 
no clear development plan or motivation, other than profit and employment.  
 
El-Fathaly and Palmer identify seven objectives that emerged from the RCC in the 
second year of the revolution onwards.  Conceptually, these can be labelled as: 
preservation of the revolution, anti-imperialism, Arab leadership, modernisation, 
populism, religiosity and militarism.  The degree to which the members of the RCC 
were individually committed to these objectives remains unclear, but the collective 
desire to achieve them was portrayed through the speeches and directives of Colonel 
Qaddafi.   
 
As a regime, it can certainly be seen that broadly speaking these objectives were 
achieved.  The only problem was getting the population to share them in their entirety 
to allow further ideological advances.  Until 1973 the RCC were still attempting to 
reorganise all levels of government along the lines laid out in Egypt, centralising 
power in their own hands.25  Aside from the rhetoric, the four-year period immediately 
after the Al-Fatah Revolution was more concerned with consolidating the regime than 
it was a transition to Arab socialism.  In this respect the RCC were entirely 
successful, particularly in providing the building blocks for the Third Universal Theory.  
 
                                                 
25 Owen, R, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Page 54 
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4. The Emergence of a Third Universal Theory 
 
Direct Democracy: “No representation in lieu of the people”  
 
By 1973, when the RCC realised that their tentative measures were not making 
sizeable advances in terms of gaining popular support for their regime, it was 
Qaddafi who become the fount of the Third Universal Theory as it developed.  
Qaddafi announced a ‘cultural revolution’ with the goal of ridding Libya of all 
‘imported poisonous ideas and fuse the people’s genuine moral and material 
potentialities’.26 Despite throwing off the shackles of imperialism in terms of foreign 
military and administrative presence, ‘foreign’ ideas still permeated the Libyan 
intelligentsia and Muslim clerical sphere.  Upon this basis, the first focus upon direct 
democracy can be witnessed, almost four years after the revolution; it was from this 
speech that participatory government gained its first public and lasting emphasis.  
The RCC felt that in order to get the support of the people for their regime, it would 
be necessary to enable, and even burden the Libyan people with the ability to govern 
themselves at the lowest possible level.  
 
Literature disagrees on the success of the cultural revolution; Ruth First argues that 
the political repression which remains, although to a far lesser extent today, means 
that Libya became ‘the most politically confined [country] in the world’ which 
seemingly undermines the object of achieving participatory democracy.27  El –Fathaly 
and Palmer, on the other hand, argue that Libya’s cultural revolution was not at all 
like it’s Chinese counterpart, and instead more akin to the Yugoslav model of workers 
self management: ‘more specifically it was to become an experiment in popular self-
administration’.28 Similar to China, Qaddafi hoped that the new People’s Committees 
would devour the reactionary bureaucracy, seen as preserving Libya’s inefficient 
economy and tribal divisions and therefore acted as a buttress against achieving 
unity and socialism.  However, unlike the Chinese, Libya had no party to lead the 
mass mobilisation – all parties had been banned, an issue discussed later in this 
                                                 
26 Qaddafi, M. Zawara Declaration, April 16 1973 
27 First, R, Libya: The Elusive Revolution (Middlesex: Penguin, 1974) Pages 138-139 
28 El-Fathaly, O.I. and Palmer, M. Political Development and Social Change in Libya (Lexington: D.C.Heath:, 
Mass., 1977), Page 118 
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essay.29  Instead the RCC recruited members of the ailing Arab Socialist Union to 
initiate the process by forming steering committees, a form of vanguard transitional 
committee.  The RCC were certainly successful in rolling out the apparent 
democratisation of Libya – arguably proving too successful by undermining future 
economic goals.   El-Fathaly and Palmer noted, ‘individuals selected to serve on the 
preparatory committees were generally teachers, principles and local government 
employees; in other words, individuals with some stature, but not members of the 
traditional local elite structure’.30  Therefore the RCC achieved its aim to force a form 
of popular, civic unity up Libya’s citizens, a civic nationalism below that of Arab 
nationalism, but above that of tribal allegiance. 
 
Elections were duly held in large public spaces where voting was accomplished by 
show of hands as opposed to secret ballot, indeed Libyans voted on average once in 
every eighteen months.31  Each of Libya’s thirty-two municipalities and 1,500 local 
wards included poplar committees for citizens, workers, students and other groups.  
The committees were mandated to co-ordinate all aspects of governance, electing 
their own chairpersons and once constituted were theoretically autonomous.  
Members of the committees could serve for no longer than two-years.  Indeed 
Qaddafi himself publicly advocated constant recall as a means of assuring that the 
committees did not lose their revolutionary zeal and become ideologically stagnant. 
 
Therefore on paper, the primary objective of the cultural revolution was achieved, 
namely the mass mobilisation and (compulsory) participation of the people.    It is, 
however, important to note that to gain compliance to such a form of government 
involved the secret police making arbitrary arrest of individuals who were anticipated 
as a threat to the new system, namely by attempting to hijack the emerging peoples 
committees; Communists, Ba’athists and followers of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
all arrested and incarcerated for the stability of the regime.  Objectively the initial 
democratisation of Libya, adjudged by it’s own theoretical terms, seemed extensive 
and successful in allowing the different regional and economic disparities to be 
reflected on such committees, whilst failing to provide any outlet for dissent.   
                                                 
29 Prohibition of Party Politics Act Number 71 of 1972, Arab Socialist Union, Jamahiriya 
30 El-Fathaly, O.I. and Palmer, M. Political Development and Social Change in Libya Page 119 
31 Davis, J, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution Page 142 
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A codified manifesto outlining Qaddafi’s commitment participatory democracy was 
codified and espoused by the Green Book, in which both arguments for a jamahiriya 
and the apparatus for it to function were outlined in detail (See Figure 1).  This 
provided the theoretical backbone to the practical objective of mass participation.  In 
it, Qaddafi critiques representative democracy, parties and class division, arguing 
that in contrast direct democracy is ‘natural’: true democracy exists only through the 
participation of the people, not through the activity of their representatives.’32  
Therefore Qaddafi proclaims that in the ideal, democratic system, there should be, 
‘no representation in lieu of the people’.33  In a representative democracy, people are 
seemingly provided with an elitist, vacuous democracy and a parliament that is in 
effect a denial of participation rather than an enabler of it - representative democracy 
is therefore false democracy.  Finally he argues that representative elections serve 
simply elites who peddle ‘propaganda’ to win votes.34  Qaddafi contends that those 
without equal access to economic resources are denied equal access to the political 
process, in line with the leftists criticisms of the democracies in the West: ‘Poor 
people fail to compete in the election campaign and it is always the rich – and only 
the rich – who come out victorious’.35 
 
Before espousing his more positive justification (and therefore goal) to achieve direct 
democracy, Qaddafi also levels criticism at the concept of party systems.  Unlike 
other socialist or communist states, Libya has never exhibited a multi or single party 
system – ‘the party is the contemporary dictatorship’; Qaddafi argues that parties 
have a tendency to oppress their members, act purely for collectivist and therefore 
divisive interests, and impose their ideals on the rest of society – ‘to make a party 
you split society.’36  Saif al-Islam Qaddafi justifies such a stance on practical as well 
as ideological grounds: ‘at that time [parties were banned] to protect the regime from 
parties such as a communist party or the Muslim Brotherhood. Libya does not have 
                                                 
32 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 2 
33 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 2 
34 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 10 
35 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 10 
36 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 11 
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the culture of parties; it is not in our history.  We are a Bedouin society so we don’t 
need parties.’37 
 
Similarly, The Green Book criticises class division, but moreover class dominance, 
including any ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. ‘The class political system is the same 
as the party…if a class or party…dominates a society, the whole system becomes a 
dictatorship.’38  Thus Colonel Qaddafi, in the wake of transition from a monarchical 
regime, increasingly prescribed a system of direct democracy which, it is claimed by 
the regime, exists in Libya today:  ‘popular congresses and people’s committees are 
the final fruit of the people’s struggle for democracy…any system of government 
other than popular congresses is undemocratic’39 
 
However, despite the rhetoric, the regime became increasingly unwilling to delegate 
power to these institutions, which they had purported to be ‘autonomous and 
sovereign.’40  This emerged not from the RCC’s desire to maintain a firm grip of 
Libya’s political goals, but devolved government soon collided with the regime’s 
attempt to eradicate poverty, or ‘need’ as Qaddafi coined it.  Given Libya’s sparse 
resources other than oil, many workers were locked into working for local 
entrepreneurs where there existed little choice in most villages and towns as to what 
an employee could do, allowing for chronic levels of exploitation.  Thus the second 
part of the implementation of the Third Universal Theory, not only imposed on the 
market, but resulted in the necessary infringement of the democratic bodies that had 
at first been created. 
 
As tensions arose between the people committees, the suppression of two coup 
attempts left Qaddafi in sole control of Libya’s political and economic future until the 
present day.  He continued to espouse the notion of direct democracy, but there is no 
                                                 
37 Saif Al-Islam Al-Qaddafi, Personal Interview, London, 28th January 2006   
Saif al-Islam Qaddafi is a son of Muammar al-Qaddafi, Leader of Libya.  He heads the Qaddafi International 
Foundation for Charity Associations, an NGO which campaigns for human rights and has intervened in various 
hostage situations involving Islamic militants.   He is known to push for Libya to adopt closer, more amiable ties 
with the West and is a keen moderniser.  Saif also performs a public relations and diplomatic role for his father. 
He has been mentioned as a possible successor, though he has firmly denied this, claiming that Libya’s future 
lies with direct democracy. 
38 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 17 
39 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 24 
40 Davis, J, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution Page 137 
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doubt that the mass mobilisation that emerged as the primary goal of the RCC would 
not re-emerge with the same verve for some time.  In 1975, Qaddafi abolished the 
RCC and replaced the Arab Socialist Union with the General Peoples Congress 
(GPC), which was meant to respond to the concerns of the local and municipal 
committees instead of the vanguard ASU and RCC.  Theoretically, this was an 
advance in democracy, in line with the withering away of the state and mirroring the 
constitutional apparatus outlined in The Green Book (See Figure 1).  In fact from this 
point Qaddafi himself had no constitutional role in the regime: ‘it restricts even 
Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi’.41 
 
In March 1977 came the announcement that Libya would henceforth be known as a 
‘jamahiriya’ – ‘state of the masses’ as further codification of the popular and 
participatory governmental objectives that were enveloping Libya.  Whilst this edict 
was distinctly top down, and is painted entirely as so by much of the academic 
literature, it is at this juncture that it becomes suitable to discuss the role of 
nationhood and ‘stalessness’ in the Libyan context. 
 
It can feasibly be argued that a nation is a social construct.  When one thinks 
intuitively of the concept of a nation, it is often conceived that a nation is ‘a group of 
people who feel themselves to be a community bound together by ties of history, 
culture and common ancestry’.42  In Libya, a common characteristic of ‘statelessness’ 
was a national concept in that there existed no state agency that had historically 
intervened with the nomadic and Bedouin tribes that occupy this part of the Sahara.  
Libya is a nation of tribes, based on distinctly local customs, with Islam being the 
main cultural characteristic binding the Libyan nation.  Qaddafi built the Third 
Universal Theory on the notion that, ‘the natural law of any society is either tradition 
(custom) or religion…A constitution should have a source for it’s justification beyond 
that which is simply ‘man-made’.43  Here Qaddafi is referring to the importance of 
Islam upon which he forms his social basis for natural democracy and natural 
socialism.44  For Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, Islam and democracy are compatible and 
natural, ‘because there are very clear verses which state that you have to have a 
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deliberative and consultative form of government.  You have to consult your people 
and you have to have deliberation between the rulers and the subjects. 45 
 
More acutely, the geography and anthropology of Libya has meant that above all, the 
tribe was the strongest political unit, not simply through tradition, but through political 
and economic practicality.  In a country that is 95 per cent desert, a state based on 
cross-country reciprocity and trade was not feasibly viable.  What vegetation grows in 
Libya grows universally along the coast and around oases and, before the discovery 
of oil, Libya’s tribal system meant that the populations of its villages were used to a 
concept of self-sufficiency and dependent on sparse local resources.  Therefore a 
concept of ‘statelessness’ is an important, natural concept for most Libyans that has 
been adopted and proposed since the revolution, but has its roots in ‘how men have 
lived, rather than how they should live’, in the Machiavellian sense.46  
 
It is true that Qaddafi sought to break hierarchical tribal structures, and by adopting a 
centralised socialist economic framework imposing modernising state agency, and 
the goal here, whether through provision of food or universal right to housing, was to 
obliterate need – ‘for in need freedom is latent’ – in order to provide economic and 
political liberty for villages and towns throughout Libya.  . 
 
However, as a result several failings emerged in meeting the objective of creating 
direct democracy, which aspired to this concept of ‘statelessness’ against a modern, 
developed economy.  Firstly, there arose problems resulting from fragmentation.  
Intentionally or otherwise, there emerged from the multiplicity of committees, ‘local 
particularism at the expense of the developing view of the common interest’.47  El-
Kikhia casually argues that by attempting to satisfy the needs of everyone, the highly 
complicated system has resulted in satisfying no-one.48  A more accurate analysis 
lends one to identify that there certainly, emerged a cleavage between the peripheral 
localities, and the political centre, which had effectively become a Qaddafi dominated 
GPC.  Davis identifies that the centralising grip of Tripoli (not always the Jamahiriya’s 
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capital, but always it centre for communications) has tended to remain weaker the 
more remote and provincial the people’s committee might be.49 
 
A second failure has emerged through the juxtaposition of central planning through 
socialism, at it emerged from 1978 onwards, and the need to at the very least 
manipulate the local committees by the national political centre.  This clearly 
undermines the grass-roots intentions of direct democracy both in theory and in 
practice, but must be viewed in the context of the logistical reasons behind it, as 
discussed later in this essay.  A similar theme emerges from the fact that in order to 
keep a degree of political flexibility in the system, the constitutional guarantees of the 
‘authority of the people’ were not written or codified outside of very general terms.  As 
problems and differences emerged, power would simply be retracted to higher levels, 
which inevitably lead to the GPC gaining control over most policy, under the influence 
of Qaddafi.  In fact the reverse principle of subsidiarity was adopted and decisions 
have ended up being taken at the highest level of expedience.50 
 
A far more pressing problem undermining the democratic structures was that of non-
participation, despite participation being legally compulsory.  Qaddafi had made it 
clear from 1973 that he wished to weed out those who did not conform to his 
thinking.  As such there was no vehicle for dissent or participation for those who 
disagreed with him.  As Hinnebusch has written, ‘as institutions of participation, as a 
system of accepted channels and procedures for making decisions…the structures 
Qaddafi has built…remain very much the creature of the leader who can change the 
rules of participation at will and cannot be held accountable in any formal way.’51 
 
By the end of the 1970’s in realising the deficiencies of the practical application of a 
decentralised system, which depended so heavily on centralised economic co-
ordination, Qaddafi coincided the application of the second part of the Third Universal 
Theory with the re-introduction of revolutionary committees.  These vanguard 
institutions were intended to allow mass mobilisation to continue without detraction 
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from the underlying national ideology of Islamic Socialism, as Qaddafi increasingly 
espoused from 1978 onwards. 
 
The ‘revolutionary sector’ was expanded against the backdrop of the Iranian 
revolution; Qaddafi was keen to enable wealth distribution across Libya, and 
launched a concerted attack on economic privilege.  The role of the political centre in 
the economy therefore became paramount in solidifying compliance with the regime 
and it was seen that in order to protect the wider objectives of the revolution, a 
vanguard-element was required in order to minimise political turbulence.  
Simultaneously, this period saw Qaddafi take, an increased role in the political and 
economic operations of the jamahiriya.52 
 
Another criticism is that can be levied is that whilst the GPC did itself exercise some 
degree of autonomy from Qaddafi on domestic issues, it has implemented central 
coercion through the revolutionary sector upon the basic peoples committees and 
congresses.  Davis cites the example of where a trade agreement with Malta had 
already been agreed centrally, before the peoples committees had even ratified such 
an agreement, which they duly obliged under pressure from the centre.53  Thus 
political power has had a tendency to flow downwards rather than upward in Libya, 
denying the converse democratic objective expounded in the Third Universal Theory. 
 
Without doubt, the role of the revolutionary committees is contradictory to the 
objective of direct democracy as set out in The Green Book.  However, it would be 
correct to identify that whist there existed this contention of the theory, the 
democratic institutions have remained intact despite interventions from the 
revolutionary sector and GPC, which have lessened in recent years.  Davis in 
particular cites a number of electoral and governing examples, dispelling the myth 
that direct democracy in Libya is entirely a mirage.54  Arguably, by holding elections 
at all rejects Qaddafi’s original theory, which rails against all ‘elections’, but given that 
his basis for this critique is founded on a desire for political equality, this is perhaps 
not the most obvious objective failing. 
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Elections that have taken place have not been without difficulty.  The Libyan press 
agency, JANA, published results in 1980 that recorded the cancellation of two 
elections due to fighting and wounded candidates.55  Also, the absence of a secret 
ballot also causes problems with tribal cleavages and conflicts emerging in some 
rural communities, exacerbated by the use of a first-past-the-post electoral system; 
Qaddafi’s direct democracy was meant to nullify the divisiveness of tribes.56 
 
In an attempt to quell such dissent, on 3rd November, 1986, the newspaper Az Zahf 
al-Akhdar, the mouthpiece of the revolutionary committees, featured an article, 
supposedly written by Qaddafi, which surprisingly proposed an urgent need to form a 
new political party. It was argued that the new political party could replace the 
people's congresses, justified by the exploitation, tribalism and reactionism that some 
of them exhibited.   The statement was seemingly motivated by a desire to purge the 
GPC and people's congresses of elements who voiced their opposition to Qaddafi’s 
policies. 
 
However, in response to continued domestic resistance and international pressure, in 
1988 Qaddafi called for the end of arbitrary arrests for political dissenters and 
announced ‘The Great Green Charter of Human Rights’.  A Ministry of Justice was 
also created to theoretically protect such rights from the previous arbitrariness of the 
regime, installing the right to independent legal council.  There did, however, exist 
major caveats, namely that provisions for private property could be overridden in the 
‘public interest’, which contradicts the Third Universal Theory’s commitment to some 
private property as discussed later. 
 
Despite the non-constitutional role that Qaddafi fulfils, his charismatic and informal 
role should not be undermined, even on the domestic scene.  There still exists 
several security organisations, such as the Intelligence Bureau of the Leader, 
Jamahiriya Security Organisation, People’s Guard and Purification Committees which 
since the late eighties and early nineties have maintained the Leader’s influence, 
                                                 
55 Bleauchot, H. ‘Chroniques et documents libyens, 1969-1980.  Chroniques de l’Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord 
(Paris: Editions du Centres National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1983) Page 257 
56 Davis, J, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution Page 147 
James Caspell 
19 
although their role is dwindling.57  Similarly, the role of the ‘revolutionary sector’ (the 
army, police and revolutionary committees) cannot be undermined in historically 
intervening with the democratic institutions of Libya, although their role is also 
diminishing as Libya espouses a commitment to greater political freedom.  Saif al-
Islam al-Qaddafi believes that whilst the revolutionary committees still exist, ‘the 
environment has changed…there is no need to use them now or for them to be 
energised,’ given the decreased threat at home and abroard.58  Also, whist the 
prominent central bureacracy arguably undermines Qaddafi’s theoretical commitment 
to devolved democracy,  ‘the cadres [of  the revolutionary sector] are not a [central] 
elite hardened by repression, but local people from local communities.  As such, 
ordinary people still have room to manoeuvre within the framework of the 
revolutionary sector,59 
 
That is not toe excuse Qaddafi’s failing in achieving the theory which he has so 
consistently espoused, after all, it was prescribed that ‘society is its own supervisor’.  
This has been undermined, more so in foreign affairs, by the prominence of Qaddafi 
in shaping policy.60 However, Saif al-Islam sees his fathers role as ‘a catalyst…we 
need a leader to speed up the journey to democracy in Libya…because without his 
support, things can be slow or stagnant. But still, he needs other people around him 
in order to implement a new direction in order to achieve that goal [of direct 
democracy].’61  
 
Also, Qaddafi’s insistence upon political and economic conformity has contradicted 
the objective of direct democracy.  As Ruth First noted, a rigid ideology, ‘suffocates 
any political thought or action not initiated by the state’.62  That said, there have been 
examples, where the GPC has rejected Qaddafi’s own views and it would be entirety 
incorrect to describe the jamahiriya as entirely dictatorial. Ironically, it can be 
interpreted that Qaddafi spoils for his own overthrow: ‘if an instrument of governing is 
dictatorial…the society’s vigilance toward deviation from law will have only one way 
of readjustment.  That is violence, which means revolution against the instrument of 
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governing’.63  There is also the question of what or who comes after the Leader?  
According to Saif al-Islam, ‘the role will dissapear…the power will go to the prime 
minister and the president and the instituions below it.  The highest executive 
position should be the Prime Minister; there should not be a president.64 
 
Opinion varies as to what extent Libya is a direct democracy, but the debate is an 
important one in establishing whether the goals of the revolution have in fact been 
achieved.  There are some obvious failures in achievement, namely the aspiration 
that the ‘central government administration is abolished’. 65 Given the influence and 
control that central government has, particularly in achieving Islamic Socialism, this 
clearly has not been the case. 
 
Also, the notion of participatory democracy does not merely consist of a theoretical 
fusion of government and administration, but more generally builds on the notion of 
'partners not wage workers' that Qaddafi has sought to embody and that popular 
committees have been formed both in the workplace and schools not simply for the 
purposes of governing, but also to garner democratic collectivist identities outside of 
the Mosque and tribe.  It can be reasonably argued that where democratic institutions 
exist, they are perhaps at the mercy of Qaddafi.  As Saif al-Islam concedes, ‘central 
government is not democratically elected and certain things do not happen without 
the consent of the leader…we need a constitution’.66 As a result, he concedes that 
Libya, ‘is not a fully democratic country…in theory we have an excellent system but 
in practice we are not there yet.  Our practice is amateur rather than professional 
direct democracy.  67 
 
According to Saif al-Islam, one step towards achieving this ‘professional’ democracy 
was taken last year, with the, ‘first democratic, transparent election to elect the 
regional government [uniformly without any intervention from revolutionary 
committees].’68  Other ways that he envisages the achievement of direct democracy 
are through the use of technology.  Saif al-Islam is supervising a project to bring e-
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government to Libya, which would abandon the revolutionary sector and 
inconvenience of the current system in having to conduct so many public, 
manipulated and open ballots.’ 
 
As it remains, there certainly exists considerable flaws in Libya’s sought achievement 
of ‘no representation in lieu of the people’.  However it is also certainly true that 
democratic conventions, institutions and cultures do exist and it would be entirely 
incorrect to label the jamahiriya a fig-leaf for dictatorship, as is the popular 
perception. 
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Islamic Socialism: ‘Partners, not wage-workers’  
  
The second major revolutionary objective focussed on transforming Libya’s managed 
market economic system by adopting a radically socialist one.  Indeed evidence of 
‘Islamic Socialism’ is witnessed in many aspects of Libya’s economy today. 
 
In the second part of The Green Book, ‘The Solution of the Economic Problem’ 
Qaddafi espouses a socialist ideal as a way of satiating individuals’ needs whilst 
preventing exploitation. The overwhelming theory is that in the ideal economic 
system, people should fulfil their own material needs wherever possible, and 
employment relations in industry should consist of ‘partners, not wage-workers’.69   
 
His critique seeks a third way between communism and capitalism, using almost a 
third camp socialist analysis of both systems; Qaddafi condemns the exploitation of 
wage-workers in the capitalist world as ‘a type of slave’, whilst he criticises the 
domination of state bureaucracy under communism.70  For Qaddafi, the ‘ultimate 
system’ is one where the wage-system is abolished and the economy is realigned to 
one of needs-fulfilment rather than exploitation.  Similar to the Marxist analysis of 
alienation, Qaddafi believes that by abolishing the wage-system, Arabs will become 
emancipated from their ‘bondage and…return to the natural law which defined 
relationships before the emergence of classes’.71 
 
Exploitation should be replaced with partnership, with each person having equal 
access to resources no matter what role they play in the scheme of production.72  An 
interesting tangent is the emphasis that Qaddafi places on the role of technology:  
‘strenuous tasks are now carried out by machine…the working class is continually 
declining as science and machines develop’.73  This in someway apes Marx’s 
appraisal of capitalism as being vital in order to provide the technological abundance 
required for communism to be viable in the modern world.  Instead of advocating a 
dictatorship of the proletariat, Qaddafi cites that the role of capital and the state as a 
                                                 
69 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 43 
70 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 45 
71 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 48 
72 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 48 
73 Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, Page 52 
James Caspell 
23 
vehicle of economic growth will wither away as democracy prevails in both political 
and economic spheres.   
 
Qaddafi’s theory has often been labelled Marxist, but a clear contrast with classical 
Marxist theory is that Qaddafi maintains a crucial need for some degree of private 
ownership. Qaddafi quantifies such basic needs as ones house, vehicle, clothes and 
food supply;  ‘the house is a basic need of both the individual and the family…there 
is no freedom for a man who lives in another’s house.’74  Whether owned by another 
private individual, or by the state, Qaddafi regards such ownership of others’ means 
for satisfying basic needs as ‘domination’, for example the owner of a man’s clothes 
has the ‘propensity to leave a man naked’.75  Property superfluous to these basic 
needs should be held collectively and democratically, as ‘the legitimate purpose of 
economic activity is solely to satisfy the need of the individual’.76  In his analogy of 
apple picking, Qaddafi again idealises the concept of self-sufficiency within a social 
framework, as opposed to exploitation by man or state.77  Therefore Qaddafi’s 
prescribes ‘private ownership to satisfy [wherever possible] the needs without using 
others, and socialist ownership in which the producers are partners in production’ 
where this is not possible.78  
 
Qaddafi is a strong proponent of industrial democracy and advocates that all public 
utilities should be run by people’s committees that will be responsible to the basic 
popular congresses, and these ‘dictate the policy to be followed by the people’s 
committees and supervise its execution.’79  Citizens should also form their own 
unions and syndicates, and manage and share the profits of public corporations.80  
Although in theory unions would become unnecessary as workers managed their 
own industries, in practice unions are seen to exist in Libya and are guaranteed 
representation at the annual meeting of the GPC.  
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Implementing goals to achieve such a form of Islamic Socialism meant nullifying 
nearly all-previous economic policies enacted previously.  From 1978 onwards, 
employment was restricted to three categories: government employees, corporate 
employees and self-employed workers.  However some elements of ‘Islamic 
Socialism’ existed from the outset of the revolution - most notably the minimum wage 
was doubled, and subsidised rents and food introduced.  However, the period 
between 1978 until 1986 saw huge expansions in welfare provision to provide 
individuals with their basic needs (generally as interpreted by the GPC), which 
admittedly fails Qaddafi’s preference for individuals to satisfy their own needs 
autonomously and locally. 
 
One appropriate test case – given that this ‘need’ is named specifically in The Green 
Book  - is housing, which was high on the policy agenda even before Qaddafi’s 
espousal of ‘true’ Islamic Socialism.  Between 1969 and 1979 Tripoli’s population had 
tripled, necessitating an expansive and centralised housing policy to accommodate 
citizens.81  As such by 1975 slums were eradicated.  In correspondence with 
Qaddafi’s theory of ownership and need, new property ownership laws mandated 
that families could only own one dwelling.  Individuals could no longer rent housing 
from other individuals – nor even the state – and instead housing was to be provided 
by the state and ownership immediately transferred to its inhabitants.  In this respect 
whilst the means were not private or autonomous, the ends were in terms of private 
ownership of ones house. By the late 1970s, the tenements surrounding Tripoli and 
Benghazi had given way to modern apartment blocks with running water and 
electricity. Between 1970 and 1986, the government invested 2.8 million Libyan Dinar 
in housing, which made possible the construction of 277,500 homes. Since 1984, 
budget allocations for housing have fallen in keeping with a general decline in 
government spending, however the housing sector has constituted one of the most 
expansive and notable of the revolution's achievements in providing a ‘basic need’ for 
Libyans. Entirely in line with Qaddafi’s objective, housing was provided for nearly all 
Libyans, with even oasis towns and troglodytes provided with housing equipped with 
satellite (state) television and water. 82   
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By the 1980s, the welfare available to Libyans included much more than was 
provided under basic social security law.  Various entitlements for retirement, work 
injury, disability and sickness were provided courtesy of Libya’s bountiful oil wealth 
and highly redistributive taxation policies. Subsidised food, free medical care and 
education, and profit sharing were among the other benefits that have dispelled the 
previously unmet ‘needs’ of most Libyans.  In addition, there emerged state nurseries 
to care for the children of working mothers, orphanages for homeless children, and 
homes for the aged. These welfare programs have reached even the oasis villages of 
the desert, where they were received with general satisfaction.83 The giving of alms 
to the poor remains one of the pillars of the Islamic faith, but the extent of public 
welfare was such that there was increasingly less call for private welfare.  Between 
1970 and 1985, the number of doctors and dentists increased sevenfold, producing a 
ratio of one doctor per 673 citizens.  The number of hospital beds tripled in the same 
period.84  More recently, Libya ranked 58th out of 177 on the 2004 United Nations 
Development Programme’s, Human Development Report - which measures quality of 
life - significantly higher than Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.85   
 
Undoubtedly, within the bounds of Qaddafi’s Third Universal Theory, the objective of 
Islamic Socialism has been largely met on a practical level.  Whilst the wage system 
has not been abolished entirely, the levels of worker protection and social security 
means that most people’s basic needs are provided for by the state whilst larger 
projects regarding economic development are now co-ordinated and funded 
publically. 
 
In seeking to create a large pool of labour for Libya’s socialist expansion, peripheral 
successful objectives have concerned the increased role of education and female  
participation both in society and the economy, particularly in teaching (see Tables 1 
and 2).  Socially, this has also moved towards Qaddafi’s desire to tackle sexual 
discrimination, which he calls a ‘flagrant act of oppression without justification.’86  The 
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increased provision of education has also acted as a form of political cohesion and 
mass mobilisation by the jamahiriya and positively correlates with the period of 
socialist expansion. 
 
The most prominent examples of centralised socialist planning are undoubtedly the 
Kufra Oasis project and the Great Man Made River.  Inherited as a showcase from 
the monarch, the project in Kufra, an oasis town in the south-east of Libya was 
nationalised and provided 50,000 acres of agricultural land in the middle of the 
Sahara by 1973, irrigated by aquifers discovered when drilling for oil.  The cost of its 
of grain compared to 20 times world prices even by 1980, but was a nevertheless an 
achievement of Islamic Socialist production as Qaddafi had prescribed. Tangentially, 
80 per cent of Kufra’s workers are foreign migrants, which has allowed Qaddafi to 
showcase his African-unity credentials since the mid-90’s.87  Similarly, the four 
phases of the Great Man-Made River, providing Libya’s coastal towns and cities with 
fresh drinking water from aquifers, yields 6.5 million cubic metres of water a day from 
over 1,000 desert wells - over 1000 litres a day per Libyan citizen. (See Figure 2)88    
 
However, the centralised planning that these projects require has arguably impacted 
upon Libya’s commitment to direct democracy. In October 1983, the General 
People's Congress held an extraordinary session to draft the resolutions for the basic 
People's Congresses to pass under pressure from the revolutiontiary committees, 
when deciding to fund and execute the Great Man-Made River Project.89  Also with 
respect to centralised intervention, where in history there has often been a tendency 
amongst rural communities to resist the encroachment of state agency, this has been 
witnessed to a certain extent in Libya with regards to disturbing cultural norms, by re-
housing those living in the mud-brick oasis towns and underground caves for 
example. Thus it can be evalutated that in many of Qaddafi’s large projects with a 
national scope, the objective of Islamic Socialism has stunted aspirations of direct 
democratic government. 
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However, the opposite trend has also occasionally been witnessed, with 
democratisation of industry resulting in job losses.  Whereas the 1973 profit-sharing 
obligation of companies seemingly increased workers incomes by requiring private 
and public firms to redistribute one-quarter of their profits, the 1978 extension 
hindered workers by undermining the profitability of the enterprises in which they 
worked. Indeed, ‘many owners liquidated their businesses rather than face losing 
control of them.’90 Finally, the ambition to make Libya nationally self-sufficient with 
regards to food has proved  understandably difficult, given the desertified terrain and 
cost of irrigation to achieve such an objective.91 
The ideological commitment to ‘Islamic Socialism’ is perhaps most remarkably 
demonstrated by the fact that despite being funded by Libya’s nationalised oil wealth, 
there is little correlation between its prosperity and redistributive social polices.  In 
real terms, GDP grew each year from 1972 to 1980 and in both 1974 and 1976, real 
GDP grew at an annual rate of over 18 per cent.  However, since 1980 – the period 
of Islamic Socialist expansion - there has been a continual decline.   The turning 
point for the economy occurred in 1981, as real GDP dropped a staggering 18 
percent.   However, exemplifying Libya’s commitment to satisfying Libyans’ ‘basic 
needs’, the only component of GDP to exhibit a steady growth during the period of 
decline was the public service sector, which rose from 5 percent in 1978 to 12 
percent in 1984.92  In real terms, this resulted to an almost doubling of the Libyan 
development budget (see Table 3).   In this sense it can certainly be argued that 
Libya’ achievement of Islamic socialism was for ideological reasons rather than 
simply as a result of economic prosperity, given the contrast of relative economic 
decline. 
However, there arises the question of how long Libya can afford to meet its socialist 
objectives based on its current model.  As Birks and Sinclair argue, ’Libya is more 
likely to collapse economically after the cessation of oil reserves than any other oil-
endowed state in the Arab world…hence the urgency for a reassessment of 
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development strategy in Libya.’93  Since the lifting of sanctions in 2004, Libya has 
sought to relax rules on the private sector and is now actively seeking foreign direct 
investment.  Such a path is endorsed by Saif- al-Islam al-Qaddafi, who argues that 
privatisation, ‘is a positive effect because you are not under the mercy of the state or 
the public sector.  [In Libya]…the state will always provide a safety net in housing 
and health but we will become similar to the Scandinavian model.’94  An interpretation 
of this statement is that by loosening up its commitment to Islamic socialism, Libya 
can more firmly achieve its goal of direct democracy, whilst also continuing to provide 
for the ‘basic need’ of future generations.  However, in the present day it can clearly 
be seen that Libya has actively and successfully achieved the aim of creating a 
socialist economy to a large extent, as espoused in Qaddafi’s Third Universal 
Theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Birks, S. and Sinclair, C. ‘Libya: Problems of a Rentier State.’  in North Africa: Contemporary Politics and 
Economic Development, edited by Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay, (Crom Helm, London, 1984) Page 273 
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5. Jamahiriya: An ideological mirage or the materialisation of a theory? 
 
In conclusion, Libya has seen a mixed achievement of the domestic aims of the Al-
Fatah Revolution and Third Universal Theory.  The regime initially responded well to 
popular sentiments of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism, but it was the combined 
aims of ‘direct democracy’ and ‘socialism’ that have been most vociferously 
espoused by Qaddafi himself. 
 
In that respect, it can be seen through qualitative and quantitative analysis that a 
socialist economy was created akin to that prescribed in The Green Book, although it 
remains to be seen how Libya’s liberalising economic agenda will affect the 
achievement of this objective.  Secondary objectives concerning the increased 
participation of women and increased provision of education have similarly been 
achieved. 
 
However, the achievement of ‘direct democracy’ as advocated by Qaddafi is certainly 
more difficult to quantify.  It is certainly not possible to argue that it is either entirely 
democratic, or entirely repressive and dictatorial.  As such, it would be a bold claim to 
say that direct democracy has been achieved in Libya as idealised in their own 
terms, although democratic institutions have indeed been formed and have governed 
their regions semi-autonomously, to greater and lesser extents, over the last thirty-
seven years.  It is often wrongly interpreted that the Libyan system is dependent 
entirely on Qaddafi’s leadership, but there is a strong case that whilst Libyans are 
used to varying degrees of political repression, which they have increasingly resisted, 
they are equally used and attached to the democratic elements of their system. 
 
The value of this essay is that it has shown that Libya has not simply spoken of  
aspirations of direct democracy and socialism as ultimate objectives’, but has gone a 
partial way to achieving them.  Thus arises the question: could Libya be a model?  
Saif al-Islam believes that the ‘natural’ objective of participatory democracy are 
witnessed in Iraq, where, ‘people committees have sprung up in villages and towns’ 
since the occupation of the Allied forces.’ 95  The value of this opinion is not for this 
                                                 
95 Saif Al-Islam Al-Qaddafi, Personal Interview, London, 28th January 2006 
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essay to decide, but it certainly corresponds with the notion that Libya has 
demonstrated a political model in it’s own right and note merely a fig leaf of 
dictatorship.  
 
Of course no conclusion is without caveat.  Methodologically, the lack of publicly 
available quantitative electoral data in particular makes definitive conclusions difficult 
and reliant on secondary literature and the interpretative field research cited in such 
literature.  A greater clause is that by interpreting the Third Universal Theory directly, 
ones own normative assumptions may have affected interpretation.  A similar 
concern regards interviewing Saif al-Qaddafi.  As with any interview, the Greenspoon 
effect and line of questioning affects outcomes.  That said, the Leader’s son 
appeared to be remarkably frank and critical of the Libyan regime and this is less of a 
concern than would perhaps be envisaged. 
 
This study has proved that based upon it’s own criteria rather than path-dependent 
criteria, the Revolutionary objectives have at least been partially achieved.  Excluding 
the clear flaws in the operation of the democratic institutions that are clearly in place, 
it is fair to say that to a large extent the goals of the AL-Fatah revolution and Third 
Universal Theory have been at least partially achieved, although in a practical rather 
than a theoretically pure sense.   
 
The conventional view of Libya is as dictatorship cloaked in eccentric rhetoric, 
however, the more one scratches below the surface, the more it becomes evident 
that the system is partially democratic and socialist, cloaked in a form of vanguard 
leadership, which itself does contradict Qaddafi’s own objectives.  Paternalistic 
intervention contravened the very political process Qaddafi advocated by preventing 
the masses from reaching the stage of true self- reliance, Qaddafi’s ostensible goal.  
 
However it is also certainly true that  direct democratic and socialist conventions, 
institutions and cultures do exist and it would be entirely incorrect to label the concept 
of a jamahiriya as simply a fig-leaf for dictatorship, as is the popular perception. 
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Appendices 
 
Figure 1. The Political Composition of the Jamahiriya 
 
Sources: Qaddafi, M., The Green Book, 3rd Edition (World Center for the Study and Research of The Green 
Book: Tripoli, Jamahiriya: 1999), Page 25
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Table 1. Educational Enrolment, Total and Female, 1975-86 
 
Level 1975-76  1980-81  1982-83  1985-86 
 
All 
Students 
Females 
All 
Students 
Females 
All 
Students 
Females 
All 
Students 
Females 
Primary 556,169 256,065 662,843 314,570 721,710 341,979 774,000 n.a. 
Secondary 166,122 55,722 296,197 118,953 420,000 n.a. 271,000 n.a 
General secondary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 88,000 n.a. 
Technical education n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 26,000 n.a. 
Teachers institutes n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 35,000 n.a. 
University and institutions of higher 
education 
13,427 2,358 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 37,000 n.a. 
Total 735,718 314,145 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,231,000 575,0243  
 
Sources: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1983-84, New York, 1986, Tables 55, 56, and 57; and Az Zahf al Akhdar, Tripoli, September 1, 1986, Joint Publications 
Research Service, Near East/South Asia Reports, NEA-86-145, November 28, 1986, 44.  
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Table 2. Number of Teachers, Total and Female 1975-86 
 
Level 1975-76  1980-81  1982-83  1985-86 
 
All 
Teacher 
Females 
All 
Teachers 
Females 
All 
Teachers 
Females 
All 
Teachers 
Females 
Primary 24,331 7,086 36,591 17,160 42,696 22,627 n.a. n.a. 
Secondary 11,819 n.a. 24,323 5,750 30,673 8,483 n.a. n.a. 
University 
and 
equivalent 
institutions 
951 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total 37,101 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 79,043  n.a 
 
Source’s: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1983-84, New York, 1986, Tables 55, 56, and 57, and Az Zahf al Akhdar, Tripoli, September 1, 1986, Joint Publications 
Research Service, Near East/South Asia Reports, NEA-86-145, November 28, 1986, 44.  
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Figure 2. Great Man Made River Project 
 
 
 
 
Source: Great Man Made River Authority, Jamahiriya, http://www.gmmra.org/contant_english.asp?id=3 14th 
April 2006 
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Table 3. Allocations of Development Plans, 1976-80 and 1981-85 
 
(Millions of Libyan Dinars) 
 1976-80  
1981-
85 
Sector Value Percentage Value Percentage 
Agriculture 1,476 16.0 3,100 17.9 
Industry (light and heavy) 1,205 13.0 4,008 23.1 
Public works 1,131 12.2 3,305 19.1 
Transportation and communications 930 10.0 2,204 12.7 
Education 522 5.6 100 0.6 
Health 276 3.0 621 3.6 
Other 3,710 40.1 3,952 22.9 
Total 9,250 100.03 17,290 100.03  
 
Sources: Birks, S. and Sinclair, C. “Libya: Problems of a Rentier State," in Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay, 
eds., North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development, New York, 1984, 243; and from Central 
Bank of Libya, Annual Report, 1984, Tripoli, n.d., 55, 60.  
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